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PROTECTION IS APPROPRIATE FOR FULLY
INDEPENDENT COMPUTERGENERATED WORKS?

ROBERT YU†
U.S. copyright law is grounded in a utilitarian philosophy: authors are granted a
limited monopoly to incentivize production of original expressive works for the benefit
of society as a whole. This philosophy may need to be applied to non-human, machine
authors in the very near future. Works of literature, music, and art are increasingly
being generated through the execution of software programs, suggesting that these
machine-authored works may become the norm rather than the exception. The
burgeoning of computer-generated works raises novel and fascinating questions of
copyrightability, but the existing literature neglects to address a basic question: does
extending copyright protection to machine-authored works promote or hinder the
purpose of copyright law?
This Comment makes several contributions to the scholarship on copyright law.
First, it poses fundamental questions regarding how the existing copyright framework
would be applied to the various players that contribute to machine-authored works
and notes the problematic aspects of such application, particularly in identifying the
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legal author of the work. Second, it evaluates whether—in the case of machine-authored
works—the human author should be allocated rights based on the economic
incentive theory. It argues that inflexible application of copyright law creates a
contribution/rights paradox because the party that contributed most to the creation of
the work—its author—is not the party to whom we would like to allocate copyright
protection. Finally, the Comment posits that because copyrights provide little economic
incentive to the players involved in creating machine-authored works, it would be
inappropriate from a social policy standpoint to extend protection to fully independent
computer-generated works.
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INTRODUCTION
When a 2.7 magnitude earthquake hit Southern California on March 17,
2014, the Los Angeles Times published a news report on the natural disaster
within three minutes.1 How the L.A. Times managed to publish a report so
quickly borders on science fiction. Moments after the quake, an algorithm
1 Ken Schwencke, Earthquake Aftershock: 2.7 Quake Strikes Near Westwood, L.A. TIMES (Mar.
17, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/mar/17/news/earthquake-27-quake-strikes-near-westwoodcalifornia-rdivor [https://perma.cc/3E9M-HB5B].
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called Quakebot scraped data from the United States Geological Survey
reports, plugged the information into a coded template, and generated the
actual text of the article.2 By the time journalist and programmer Ken
Schwencke had been woken by the quake and had walked to his computer, the
text was already on the screen, ready for publication at the press of a button.3
While the L.A. Times article was revised and updated over the course of
the morning by actual human writers, all of their work built off the foundation
Quakebot constructed. And Quakebot is not the only program of its kind. From
reports on homicide4 to college sports statistics,5 software that automatically
generates news stories is becoming increasingly prevalent in journalism.
Quakebot’s article was not particularly sophisticated; it provided only the
magnitude of the quake and its geographic location.6 But, however simple,
banal, or nondescriptive they might be, machine-authored works like the
article prepared by Quakebot are becoming indistinguishable from their
human-authored counterparts.7
As defined by this Comment, a “machine-authored work” is a fully
independent computer-generated work. The “machine author” is a software
program, like Quakebot, designed to generate literary content on command.
The “work” is the byproduct of executing the software programming.
Machine-authored works distinctly differ from what might historically be
considered “machine-aided” works. A movie edited in the video-editing
software Final Cut Pro, for example, would be a machine-aided work but not
a machine-authored work. Although the machine computed and created the
final product, it was only able to do so at the creative direction of its human
operator. Thus, the most notable difference between a machine-authored work
and a machine-aided work is that in the case of a machine-authored work,
there is no distinct human author driving the creative process through
composition, arrangement, selection, or direction.

2 Will Oremus, The First News Report on the L.A. Earthquake Was Written by a Robot, SLATE
(Mar. 17, 2014, 5:30 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2014/03/17/quakebot_los_angeles_
times_robot_journalist_writes_article_on_la_earthquake.html [https://perma.cc/28Q6-C336].
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Klint Finley, In the Future, Robots Will Write News That’s All About You, WIRED (Mar. 6, 2015,
12:06 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/03/future-news-robots-writing-audiences-one [https://perma.
cc/JUH4-SYCK].
6 Oremus, supra note 2.
7 See, e.g., Christer Clerwall, Enter the Robot Journalist, 8 JOURNALISM PRAC. 519 (2014) (finding,
through an empirical study on software-generated content perception, that participants were not
able to discern works generated by software from works written by a human author).
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The burgeoning of machine-authored works raises novel and fascinating
questions of copyrightability. Some questions are more intuitive than others.8
For example, legal scholars going as far back as the 1980s have expounded on
the foundational question of whether machine-authored works are legally
entitled to copyright protection.9 Applying the basic inquiries of originality
and authorship, many legal scholars have concluded that machine-authored
works should be entitled to full copyright protection.
Yet the existing literature neglects a far more fundamental question: does
extending copyright protection to machine-authored works promote or hinder
the purpose of copyright law? U.S. copyright law is grounded in a utilitarian
philosophy: authors are granted a limited monopoly to incentivize production
of original expressive works for the benefit of society as a whole.10 The rationale
behind these measures has been intuitive and comprehensive—without such
protection, authors would have less of an incentive to continue creating works
and the public would suffer from this lack of creativity.11 The economic
incentive theory has gained greater traction as technological progress places
authors at a significant disadvantage to potential imitators.12 Particularly in
the digital age, where the marginal costs and sometimes even the fixed costs
of reproduction are effectively zero, imitators have a considerable advantage
over creators.13 Consequently, content producers who bear significant fixed
8 Compare William T. Ralston, Copyright in Computer-Composed Music: HAL Meets Handel,
52 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 281 (2005) (evaluating how copyright law might be applied to
machine-authored musical works), with Jeffrey Malkan, Rule-Based Expression in Copyright Law, 57
BUFF. L. REV. 433 (2009) (analyzing whether copyright should be extended to works that create
rules for creating other works, of which machine-authored works could possibly be a category).
9 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works, 47 U.
PITT. L. REV. 1185 (1986) (arguing that allocating rights to the licensed user of the program that
generated the work is most compatible with traditional copyright law doctrine); Andrew J. Wu, From
Video Games to Artificial Intelligence: Assigning Copyright Ownership to Works Generated by Increasingly
Sophisticated Computer Programs, 25 AIPLA Q.J. 133 (1997) (evaluating and generating guidelines for
granting copyright to non-derivative, computer-generated works).
10 See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the
[Copyright] [C]lause . . . is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain
is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors . . . .”).
11 See Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63,
163 (2002–2003) (“Copyright law has traditionally centered on economic interests—assuring content
creators and distributors means of appropriating sufficient return in the marketplace in order to
promote investment in creative endeavors.”).
12 See id. at 103 (“The ease with which digital technology enables anyone with a computer and
an Internet connection to reproduce and make available for wide-scale distribution flawless
reproductions of works of authorship has proven a far greater concern and more wrenching
adjustment for copyright law . . . .”).
13 See id. at 162-63 (“The rapid rise of peer-to-peer networks and the success of hackers in
cracking and disseminating means of decrypting . . . demonstrate the vulnerability of the current
network architecture to widespread unauthorized distribution and the relative impotence of existing
legal protections.”).
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costs in production and face uncertain payouts are placed in an even stronger
position to demand enhanced copyright protection.14
Yet, even within the economic rationale framework, machine-authored
works present notable differences to traditional works. For example, with
machine-authored articles, both the fixed and variable costs of producing each
copyrightable article are effectively zero, which allows producers to compete
with imitators even absent legal protection. Additionally, unlike a human
author, the software program that constructs the article cannot be legally or
economically incentivized to produce more or fewer works. For example, if
an online sports writer discovers that he can generate stable income through
his copyrighted articles, he is economically incentivized to write more articles.
A software program, on the other hand, will follow its programming and
generate articles regardless of such economic rewards.
Two counterpoints might be offered to such an argument: first, that
copyright protection is designed to motivate the software creator to create
more software and, by extension, more creative works; and second, that
copyright protection is designed to motivate users licensing the software to
generate more creative works. However, these points are unpersuasive in the
context of machine-authored news articles. As to the first, copyrightability
can be extended to the software without being extended to the articles
generated by the software. And as to the second, because control and
profitability for modern electronic news depend on being first to market,
copyrightability creates little incentive for the software end-user. Specifically,
the value of electronic news peaks within the first six hours and then
diminishes significantly.15 By the time copyright protection is secured, the
residual value of the article is minimal.16
Consequently, stringently mapping the existing copyright framework
onto machine-authored works would implicate much of the cost of copyright
protection but little of the benefit. For example, under a regime in which
machine-authored works are de facto copyrightable, a single individual could,
absent any contractual workarounds, own an indefinite number of copyrights.
Such an individual could easily behave in ways that would hinder rather than
promote future creative efforts. Consider the extreme hypothetical example of
media conglomerate ANS with a machine-authorship program. Finding that a
startup, FastNews, which produces articles comparable to its machine-authored
14 See id. at 164 (“One of the key factors harmonizing [the social bargain between content
producers and the public] has been the inherent limitations of analog technology platforms on
unauthorized reproduction and distribution of works of authorship. . . . [D]igital technology
platform[s] today . . . lack[] such constraints.”).
15 See infra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing how the value of electronic news is
measured by its website traffic, which declines significantly six hours after it is posted).
16 See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
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works, generates more traffic, ANS leverages several copyright infringement
lawsuits at FastNews to shut it down. FastNews sells to ANS at a fraction of its
valuation after being rendered illiquid by litigation expenses. A legal framework
that permits a single party to aggregate a significant number of copyrights
through minimal effort readily invites this type of anticompetitive behavior.
This Comment makes several contributions to the scholarship on
copyright law. First, it poses fundamental questions regarding the application
of the existing copyright framework to the various players involved in
creating machine-authored works—particularly with respect to identifying
the legal author of the work. Second, it evaluates whether, in the case of
machine-authored works, the human author should be allocated rights based on
the economic incentive theory. It argues that inflexible application of
copyright law creates a contribution/rights paradox because the party that
contributed to the creation of the work—its author—is not the party to whom
we would like to allocate copyright protection. Finally, the Comment posits
that because copyrights provide little economic incentive to the players
involved in creating machine-authored works, it would be inappropriate from
a social policy standpoint to extend protection to such fully independent
computer-generated works.
Part I briefly discusses the purpose and basic requirements of copyright
law, emphasizing the traditional stance that the incentives provided to the
content producers are designed to purposefully, if indirectly, benefit the public.
Part II discusses the legal nature and treatment of machine-authored works,
specifically within the context of works that are fully and independently
computer-generated.17 Part II also provides a brief overview of the technical
components behind machine-authored works, distinguishes such works from
subsequent human-authored derivative works, and highlights the legal
treatment in jurisdictions that have addressed the issue. Part III discusses the
numerous problems arising from affording full copyright protection to
machine-authored works. This discussion, in part, reassesses how confident we
should be that machine-authored works satisfy the legal requirements for
copyright protection. Part IV concludes that applying the existing copyright
framework would be inappropriate and discusses some alternative protection
measures specifically targeting machine-authored works. It proposes three
possible alternatives: (1) place machine-authored works immediately in the
public domain; (2) assign a two-tier system of protection akin to quasi-property
rights; or (3) assign the copyright to the programmer, but limit infringement
to one-to-one identical copying.

17 An example of one such work is the original article that Quakebot authored. See supra text
accompanying notes 1–3.
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I. PURPOSE AND LEGAL REQUIREMENTS OF COPYRIGHT LAW
Courts have repeatedly stated that the primary purpose of copyright is to
benefit the public.18 Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution empowered
Congress to pass legislation to “promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their Respective Writings and Discoveries.”19 Indeed, the authority
for Congress to pass the Copyright Act of 1909 and subsequent amendments
came from this enumerated power of the U.S. Constitution.20 Thus, as
commentators have properly noted, copyright protection is premised on the
benefit a creative author can give to the public and the necessity of a copyright
to realize such a benefit.21 By extension, copyright protection cannot be
justified where no public benefit is conferred.22
As amended, the Copyright Act of 1976 imposes two major requirements
for copyrightability. Under the Act, to receive copyright protection, a work
must be (1) of original authorship and (2) fixed in a tangible medium.23
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has read the first prong—originality—to also

18 See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The immediate
effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate
aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”); see also Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (“It is evident that the monopoly
granted by copyright actively served its intended purpose of inducing the creation of new material
of potential historical value.”).
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
20 Id.
21 See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A], at 188.18 (2011) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT] (“[T]he authorization to grant to individual
authors the limited monopoly of copyright is predicated upon the dual premises that the public
benefits from the creative activities of authors, and that the copyright monopoly is a necessary
condition to the full realization of such creative activities.” (footnote omitted)); William M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989) (“A
distinguishing characteristic of intellectual property is its ‘public good’ aspect. . . . For copyright law
to promote economic efficiency, its principal legal doctrines must, at least approximately, maximize
the benefits from creating additional works minus both the losses from limiting access and the costs
of administering copyright protection.”); see also Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A
Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970) (arguing
that the only defensible justification of copyright is the economic balance between maximizing
distribution and encouraging production of creative works).
22 See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 21, § 1.03[A], at 1-88.18 (“Implicit in this [copyright]
rationale is the assumption that in the absence of such public benefit, the grant of a copyright monopoly
to individuals would be unjustified.”); Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 586 F. Supp. 911,
913 (D. Minn. 1984) (quoting and citing Nimmer on Copyright with approval), rev’d, 770 F.2d 128 (8th
Cir. 1985).
23 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976).
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require at least a modicum of creativity.24 I consider each of these requirements,
original authorship and fixation in a tangible medium, in turn.
While not defined in the statute, the term “original” has been subject to
both congressional explanation and judicial interpretation. Notably, a House
report explains that Congress purposefully left the phrase “original works of
authorship” undefined to adopt the standard established by the courts at the
time the legislation was passed.25 Courts, in turn, have adopted several rules
to establish originality. Chief among them are two distinctions: (1) creative
versus factual or “sweat-of-brow” works, and (2) works with attributed authorship
versus works without attribution. First, courts are willing to uphold copyright
protection for works with even the smallest amount of creativity26 but are
unwilling to extend protection to facts, even if their discovery or compilation
requires significant “sweat-of-brow” effort.27 Second, courts will grant
copyright protection only to individuals who can prove that they independently
generated the protectable elements of their work.28 For example, the plaintiff
in Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Jostens, Inc. tried to copyright the phrase “You’ve
got to stand for something, or you’ll fall for anything.”29 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, affirmed the district court’s decision
that the phrase lacked originality, since it had been used by Ginger Rogers,
Martin Luther King, and even Abraham Lincoln.30 The court held that it was
reasonable for the district court to conclude that “the prior usage of the saying

24 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (discussing the
holding in the Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879), in which the Court determined that “originality
requires independent creation plus a modicum of creativity”).
25 See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 21, § 2.01, at 2-5 to 2-6 (stating that “originality” was
left undefined to incorporate changing standards); see also Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d
905, 910 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[T]he one pervading element prerequisite to copyright protection regardless
of the form of the work is the requirement of originality—that the work be the original product of the
claimant.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486,
489-90 (2d Cir. 1976))).
26 See, e.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951) (“All that
is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute [requiring originality] is that the ‘author’
contributed something more than a ‘merely trivial’ variation, something recognizably ‘his own.’
Originality in this context ‘means little more than a prohibition of actual copying.’” (footnotes omitted)).
27 See Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1372 (5th Cir. 1981) (refusing to
grant copyright protection to a journalist’s research that Universal appropriated for its movie on the
grounds that research is discovery of fact, which is not copyrightable); see also Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499
U.S. at 363-64 (refusing to award copyright protection to a telephone book because there was no
creativity in the arrangement of the work).
28 See, e.g., Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Jostens, Inc., 155 F.3d 140, 143 (2d Cir. 1998) (declining
to grant copyright protection over certain song lyrics because the phrase at issue had been attributed
to multiple other songs and the plaintiff did not establish that it independently created the phrase).
29 Id. at 141.
30 Id. at 143.
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was sufficiently widespread as to make it exceedingly unlikely . . . that [the
plaintiff] had, in fact, independently created the phrase.”31
The next requirement, fixation, demands that the work be embodied in a
physical object recorded by or under the authority of the author and be
sufficiently permanent to be perceived or reproduced with the aid of a
machine.32 The embodiment can be digital, even if it is temporarily stored in
a computer’s memory.33 Thus, the digital nature of a machine-authored work
does not bar the work from being copyrightable on the grounds that it has
not been properly fixed in a tangible medium.
The historical context of the Copyright Act and its nuanced legal
requirements establish a useful foundation for analyzing machine-authored
works. First, the principal beneficiary of copyright protection is the public, not
the author. Therefore, in determining whether a work should be copyrighted,
the primary consideration should be the expected public benefit. Second,
copyrightability depends on the creative nature of the work, not its labor
intensiveness. Third, only the author is eligible for copyright protection;
therefore, only the author’s filing for copyright protection can satisfy the first
prong of the Copyright Act—works of original authorship.34 As such, when
analyzing whether a novel type of work should be protected, the Copyright
Office and courts should consider whether the copyrights are “the fruits of
intellectual labor”35 that have been “founded in the creative powers of the
mind”36 and would generate future benefit for the public good.
II. MACHINE-AUTHORED WORKS
A. Machine-Authored Works Defined
Historically, courts have grappled with the issue of emerging technology
and copyright protection. The iconic case of Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
Sarony, for example, assessed whether a photograph could be copyrighted

Id. at 144.
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (providing that material to be copyrighted must be “fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device”).
33 See, e.g., Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999, 1007-08 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(finding that the fixation requirement was satisfied where the audiovisual elements of the plaintiff ’s
video games were written into storage even though some components of gameplay were only written
in the machine’s random access, and thus, temporary, memory), aff ’d, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983).
34 See, e.g., Gladys Music, Inc. v. Arch Music Co., 62 Civ. 1594, 1966 WL 7634, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
June 15, 1966) (finding that the plaintiff had secured exclusive rights and privileges to a song when
he filed a certificate of registration).
35 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (emphasis omitted).
36 Id.
31
32
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even though a camera, not a person, had physically created the work.37
Burrow-Giles perfectly highlights the emerging tension between technology
and copyright protection because photographs were a novel technology at the
time of the case and had not been previously contemplated by the Copyright
Act of 1802.38 The Burrow-Giles Court found that the human behind the
camera was the true author, and thus entitled to the “exclusive right to use,
publish and sell” the photograph, because he was the one who composed the
image.39 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Miller found that by posing
Oscar Wilde in a particular way, in a certain costume, and under particular
lighting, Sarony exercised sufficient control over the photographic product
for it to constitute an original work of art.40 In this case, the camera was
merely a tool that helped facilitate the fixation of the author’s creativity.41
This reasoning has continued to hold even in cases where a machine does
the bulk of the work.42 A modern example can be found in Stern Electronics,
Inc. v. Kaufman, in which the Second Circuit held that video games were
copyrightable even though computer programs generated the audiovisual
displays.43 Breaking down the analysis by element, the court stated,
Someone first conceived what the audiovisual display would look like and sound
like. Originality occurred at that point. Then the program was written. Finally,
the program was imprinted into the memory devices so that, in operation with
the components of the game, the sights and sounds could be seen and heard.
The resulting display satisfies the requirement of an original work.44

In some ways, a machine-authored work appears to be the next logical
stepping stone. But machine-authored works are unique in at least one
important respect: there is no human input in the generation of the work in
question. The software itself generates content through a natural language
system, a style of coding (rather than a language itself) that focuses on

111 U.S. 53 (1884).
See id. at 58 (“The only reason why photographs were not included in the extended list in
the act of 1802 is probably that they did not exist, as photography as an art was then unknown . . . .”).
39 See id. at 54-60 (noting that the plaintiff made the photograph “entirely from his own
original mental conception, . . . arranging the subject so as to present graceful outlines, arranging
and disposing the light and shade” and holding that these findings “show this photograph to be an
original work of art”).
40 Id. at 60.
41 See id. at 60-61 (recognizing that this is a case of first impression, but finding persuasive the
reasoning in Nottage v. Jackson, [1883] 11 QB 627 (Eng.), that “‘author’ involves originating, making,
producing, as the inventive or master mind, the thing which is to be protected”).
42 See, e.g., Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999, 1014 (1982) (upholding
copyright protection for video games, which are primarily machine-operated).
43 669 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir. 1982).
44 Id. at 856-57.
37
38
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decisionmaking.45 At every step of the creation process, it makes choices as
to content, format and organization, style, packaging, and syntax. Ostensibly
sophisticated, the process can be broken down into two core steps: text
planning and sentence planning. In the first step, the program determines
what information to communicate and how to structure the information into
coherent text. In the second step, the program parses through possible lexical
choices and makes decisions about what structures to use. In many ways, when
creating a work, the program thinks much as a human brain would.
To make concrete the abstract legal relationships involved in generating a
machined-authored work, consider the creation of a machine-authored work
from beginning to end. For simplicity, assume that a single person, Adam,
wrote a program named “Bot” on his computer. Bot takes statistics from
NFL.com and combines them with a natural language algorithm, which
Adam coded, to generate a news article that recaps the score and notable plays
of any football game. Adam then licenses Bot to Charles, who publishes a
dozen articles on football games that Bot generated in the past week.
Existing jurisprudence will allow Adam to copyright his source code for
Bot. Following the reasoning in Burrow-Giles, Adam is the author, as he used
a machine—his computer—to channel his creative energies to generate a
protectable work—a software program—that is fixed in a tangible medium on
his hard drive.46 As the author and owner, Adam is entitled to license his
program out to Charles to use.47 The questions left unanswered by current
jurisprudence concern the copyrightability of the dozen articles that Bot
generated for Charles: Would Charles be considered the author of these works
since he was the one who commanded Bot to generate the articles? Would
these works be considered derivative works of the original Bot program,
making Adam the author? Might Charles and Adam be joint authors? Could
Bot itself be an author?
B. Copyrightability of Machine-Authored Works
When the issue of machine-authored works was first contemplated, the
Register of Copyrights did not determine whether these works would be
copyrightable.48 Rather, the Register stated, “The crucial question appears to
45 See generally EHUD REITER & ROBERT DALE, BUILDING NATURAL LANGUAGE
GENERATION SYSTEMS (2000) (discussing the various aspects and technical features of creating a
natural language generation system).
46 See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text.
47 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (noting that Copyright protection subsists “in original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated”).
48 See COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SIXTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS 1, 5 (1966) (recognizing the need for change in copyright law and electing to begin
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be whether the ‘work’ is basically one of human authorship, with the computer
merely being an assisting instrument, or whether the traditional elements of
authorship . . . were actually conceived and executed not by a man but by a
machine.”49 Official reports by the National Commission on New Technological
Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) and the United States Congress
Office of Technology Assessment elected not to resolve the issue, noting that
machine-authored works were too far in the future to address and that there
were too many ambiguities to resolve at that time.50
This governmental hesitance has not stopped legal commentators from
analyzing how machine-authored works should be treated. Indeed, as one
commentator noted, the existing copyright framework can be readily applied
to the context of machine-authored works.51 After all, whether works are
composed by humans or machines, the same fundamental requirements of
originality, fixation, and modicum of creativity apply.
In analyzing originality, it is important to recall that courts have repeatedly
refused to determine what is or is not “original enough” to warrant copyright
protection, emphasizing that it is not the court’s role to judge the artistic
merits of the work.52 That said, the elementary and somewhat factual nature
of machine-authored works may be irrelevant to establishing originality,
especially since many of these works are indistinguishable from their humancreated counterparts. Consequently, many commentators have concluded that
the particular expression of the facts by the machine-author is sufficient to
establish originality.53
Extending from originality is the requirement for a modicum of creativity.
In some jurisdictions, even the slightest amount of creativity, including “[a]
copyist’s bad eyesight or defective musculature, or a shock caused by a clap of
considering technological differences rather than applying the traditional copyright framework to
all works irrespective of technology).
49 Id. at 5.
50 See Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and ComputerGenerated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977, 1044-45 (1993) (“CONTU
concluded unanimously that the artificial intelligence Register Kaminstein had envisioned eight
years earlier had not yet been developed and was not immediately foreseeable.”).
51 See id. at 1054 (“[T]echnological developments have not outstripped the capacity of our
current copyright law to adapt to the creative opportunities offered by new technologies.”).
52 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It would be a
dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of
the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”); Alfred Bell
& Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951) (“[T]he courts have not undertaken
to assume the functions of critics, or to measure carefully the degree of originality, or literary skill
or training involved.”).
53 See Miller, supra note 50, at 1049 (arguing that the existing copyright framework can apply
to machine-authored works); Samuelson, supra note 9, at 1195-96 (concluding that machine-authored
works can be original enough to be copyrighted); Wu, supra note 9, at 148-49 (discussing to whom
to award the copyright based on a multifactor test analyzing contributions to the originality).
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thunder, may yield sufficiently distinguishable variations.”54 Given that a
computer program uses natural language algorithms to generate unique
expressions of the same set of facts, courts are very likely to find the minimal
level of creativity necessary for copyright protection.
While the fixation element would readily be satisfied, there is a question
of who fixed the work. While most cases suggest that the user fixed the work
by initiating the program,55 there is also a possible claim that the computer
programmer is the one who fixed the work.56
III. PROBLEMS OF APPLYING TRADITIONAL
COPYRIGHT FRAMEWORK
The issue of fixation segues into the larger and more hotly contested issue
of authorship. Authorship presents significant problems for applying the
traditional copyright framework to machine-authored works. Different
scholars have proposed that the machine author, programmer, end-user, and
joint variants (programmer and machine, end-user and machine, programmer
and end-user) be considered the author who should receive copyright
protection.57 Each proposal has an intuitive reasoning seemingly grounded in
traditional copyright doctrine. But, on closer inspection, each is inconsistent
with copyright policy.
A. Authorship and Ownership
1. Machine as Author
One possibility is for the machine or software program to be awarded
authorship. Such an allocation would be consistent with the court’s historical
approach of awarding authorship to the entity that is the actual creative force

54 Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 105; see also Wu, supra note 9, at 152-53 (quoting Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d
at 105); cf. Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir. 1980) (rejecting a copyright
claim in licensed plastic toys based on Mickey Mouse and holding that originality for the derivative
work must (1) be nontrivial and (2) reflect the degree to which it relies on preexisting material and
not affect the copyright scope of that preexisting material); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d
486, 493-94 (2d Cir. 1976) (rejecting for copyrightability a derivative Uncle Sam Mechanical Bank,
holding that the author must contribute substantial, not merely trivial, originality).
55 See, e.g., Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding the fixation
element satisfied in Stern’s video game Scrabble because the same sequence appears numerous times
whenever a player starts a match).
56 See, e.g., Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding
that the fixation requirement is met in Williams’s video game Defender even though “new” images
are generated between play mode and attract mode).
57 See generally Samuelson, supra note 9 (discussing at length the possible permutations of rights
that could be assigned to various players that contribute to the creation of a machine-authored work).
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behind the copyrightable work.58 However, while the machine is unequivocally
the entity that generated the actual end product, assigning ownership to the
machine raises a significant legal issue, as software and machinery have no
legal personhood.59 Despite the logical rationale behind such allocation, it is
unlikely that courts will grant a copyright to an entity with no legal personhood.
2. Programmer as Author
The programmer has undoubtedly made the largest contribution to the
originality and creativity of the machine-authored work. The programmer
conceived of how he could create a software program that generates literary
works, crafted a plan to build that program, generated the necessary coding,
and troubleshoots all of the bugs preventing the program from executing
properly. Consequently, one might argue that any machine-authored work
product is enabled only through the ingenuity of the programmer. Following
this intuition, it would be reasonable to allocate the copyright of the
machine-authored work to the programmer. However, because the work was
ultimately created independent of any direct input from the programmer, it
is unclear whether the programmer should be entitled to any statutory claim
on anything beyond the original software.
Of course, one could argue that the works created by the software are
derivative works based off of the original programming.60 However, the
traditional application of derivative works requires that the work not just
satisfy the intuitive definition of “based on” (i.e., but-for causation), but that
the work be predicated upon, or built off of, the previous work.61 As such,
legally classifying machine-authored works as derivative works would be
inaccurate because the works are not based on a “recognizable block of
expression from the program.”62
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
See Samuelson, supra note 9, at 1199 (“Despite the fact that the statute does not require that
one be human to qualify as an author, is it still fair to say that it was not within Congress’
contemplation to grant intellectual property rights to machines. In the long history of the copyright
system, rights have been allocated only to humans.”).
60 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining a “derivative work” as “a work based upon one or more
preexisting works”).
61 Id.; see also, e.g., Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir. 1980) (“First,
to support a copyright the original aspects of a derivative work must be more than trivial. Second,
the scope of protection afforded a derivative work must reflect the degree to which it relies on
preexisting material and must not in any way affect the scope of any copyright protection in that
preexisting material.”).
62 Darin Glasser, Copyrights in Computer-Generated Works: Whom, if Anyone, Do We Reward?,
2001 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 24, ¶ 18; see also Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1985)
(explaining that one prong of copyright’s “substantial similarity” test “is used to determine whether
two works are substantially similar in their ‘forms of expression’”); Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d
1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that to “constitute a violation of section 106(2) the infringing work
58
59
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3. End-User as Author
Allocating rights to the end-user seems to make the most economic sense.
Indeed, CONTU favored this allocation in its assessment when it stated,
“[The] obvious answer [to the question of who is the author of a computergenerated work] is that the author is [the] one who employs the computer.”63
Notably, this assessment was predicated upon the perception that the user
would have a substantial contribution in shaping the output.64 As such, this
position becomes difficult to defend when the role of the user is close to
nonexistent since anyone claiming authorship rights must have tinkered with
the subject matter to make the work indisputably his own.65
Because the user has to engage the program for it to produce an output
(e.g., typing “start” or clicking a button), one could make a tenuous argument
that such action constitutes the level of contribution necessary to warrant
protection. We might think of the program as similar to a camera or other
mechanical device, and users of these devices are often considered the authors
of the creative works produced.66 However, this argument fails to address that
the creative decision made when generating machine-authored works is much
more limited than the creative decision made when producing a work with
a camera or recording device. Unlike the lithographer in Burrow-Giles, the
end-user of a computer program makes no real decision as to composition or
arrangement. Consequently, it is difficult to argue that the program is assisting
in human creativity.
4. Joint Authorship
Assigning joint authorship (in any permutation) appears, at first glance,
to nicely avoid the question of who is the primary author of the work. After
all, each author has played a role in the creation of the final product, so it
seems to make sense that copyright protection be afforded to all contributors.

must incorporate in some form a portion of the copyrighted work”); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
supra note 21, § 3.06, at 3-34.29 (“All works are composed of pre-existing elements—whether words,
paints or shapes, musical notes, or otherwise. But it does not follow that all works are therefore
derivative or collective.”).
63 Miller, supra note 50, at 1056 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting NAT’L COMM’N
ON NEW TECH. USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 45 (1979)).
64 See id. at 1045 (viewing the computer as “a tool to assist a human author”).
65 See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 21, § 2.01[A], at 2-9 (explaining the meaning of
originality in the copyright sense, and stating that a work is original if it is “a product of the
independent efforts of its author”).
66 See Samuelson, supra note 9, at 1202 (explaining that, under copyright law, someone who
tape-records a live musical performance is considered the author of the sound recording produced,
even though the user’s creative input consisted only of pressing the “record” button).
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However, joint authorship allocation raises more problems than it solves. The
primary problem is the existing legal standard for “joint work,” which requires
(1) that each individual’s contribution be independently copyrightable67 and
(2) that each individual prepared his contribution with the intent that the
works would be joined together into an inseparable and unitary whole.68
The machine-authored work would likely fail both components of the
legal test for a joint work. On the first component, it is unclear what the
programmer contributed to the machine-authored work. His contribution
could be the software programming, but, because his code can be copyrighted
separately, such an arrangement would allow for double dipping. If the code
cannot be considered his contribution, the programmer would have contributed
nothing to the scheme. Additionally, the end-user’s contribution of button
pressing or word typing is unlikely to be independently copyrightable because
the act of pressing a button or typing a word is unlikely to be original or
contain a modicum of creativity as a matter of law. On the second component,
it is difficult to argue that the programmer intended for all of his licensees to
collaborate with him on a joint venture because the parties who will later use
the software were not identified at the time the program was created. The
standard for joint works, which requires that both parties intended at the time
of initial bargaining that their works be combined,69 is therefore unlikely to
be satisfied. Thus, while assigning joint authorship might seem attractive at
first, it is a relatively untenable solution.
B. The Contribution/Rights Paradox
Let us assume that copyright contributions of the individual human entities
leading to the creation of the machine-authored work created assignable
authorship rights. The second problem that arises is that no variation of
copyright attribution and ownership allocation both satisfies the elements of
the statute as construed by court precedent and remains consistent with
public policy.
Accepting for the present that the actual software is not a legal entity
capable of owning a copyright, we will consider awarding the protection to
one of the two parties remaining: the programmer and the end-user. On the
one hand, copyright law is predicated on incentivizing the creative author. In
67 See Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that, for a work to meet
the statutory definition of “joint work,” the contribution of each joint author must be copyrightable).
68 See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 731-32 (1989) (finding that the
parties could be joint authors in a sculpture work if they “prepared the work ‘with the intention that
their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole’” (quoting
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988))).
69 Id.
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the case of machine-authored works, the programmer has contributed the
most creative effort to the resulting work and could presumably secure the
copyright. Applying the traditional copyright law framework, we can readily
conclude that the programmer should be granted copyright protection on all
machine-authored works. On the other hand, allowing the programmer to
copyright not only his software but also any subsequent outputs over-rewards
him for his efforts70 and invites copyright stockpiling. A program like
Quakebot might produce only a few dozen articles per year because its work
is constrained to natural disasters, but a machine-author that writes on
breaking news could produce a few dozen articles per day, each with copyright
protection assigned to the programmer. While it is possible for other creators
to write on the underlying facts through their own expression, this allocation
regime would result in further copyright infringement litigation that would
not be to the benefit of a public already inundated with copyright takedown
notifications and DMCA claims.71
Allocating the copyright to the end-user ostensibly makes more sense
from both social policy and economic standpoints. Because the end-user is
ultimately the one who determines whether a machine-authored work is
produced, economic incentives should align the interests of the end-user with
the interests of the general public because the end-user determines the
volume and quality of articles that fill the market. The programmer is
incentivized to create the software independently of economic incentives to
generate machine-authored works because his or her code is already entitled to
copyright protection. If we are concerned with incentivizing the production
of more creative works, it seems better to award copyright protection to the
end-user, who is far more likely to play a meaningful role in generating works

70 See JOHN HAUGELAND, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: THE VERY IDEA 12 (1985) (noting
that since the products created by the program are not predicted by the original programmer, the
programmer should not be rewarded for those works).
71 See, e.g., Chris Welch, Google Received over 75 Million Copyright Takedown Requests in February,
VERGE (Mar. 7, 2016, 11:02 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2016/3/7/11172516/google-takedownrequests-75-million [https://perma.cc/WBP5-4K9D] (highlighting Google’s receipt of 75 million
requests to take down copyright-infringing URLs in March 2016, and noting that the majority of
the notices are legitimate); see also Andy, Google DMCA Notice Record Smashed Again – But Why?,
TORRENTFREAK (Sept. 6, 2015), https://torrentfreak.com/google-dmca-notice-record-smashed-again
-but-why-150906 [https://perma.cc/5WRG-4E8T] (discussing how websites are using multiple
domains to circumvent blocking efforts, leading to a vicious cycle of increasing takedowns); Andy
Smith, YouTube Taking Steps to Improve False Copyright Claims, TUBULARINSIGHTS (Feb. 29, 2016),
http://www.tubularinsights.com/youtube-false-copyright-claims [https://perma.cc/28GK-KUJ8]
(discussing YouTube’s efforts to combat takedown abusers who report videos that actually did not
infringe copyright).
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than the programmer.72 In news production, for example, an end-user, like
the L.A. Times, plays a larger role in pushing news into the public sphere than
would the software company that created the machine author because it
determines what news articles are publication-worthy and what nuances
should be emphasized within a given article. However, under traditional
copyright doctrine, it would be difficult for the end-user to secure a copyright
because he has contributed very little to the creative process and holds the
weakest claim to any copyrightable contribution.73 The mere action of
pressing a button would likely not satisfy the modicum of creativity standard
established in Feist.
Thus, the contribution/rights paradox exists because the party that can
secure the copyright is not the party that merits copyright protection. One
way to avoid this paradox would be to consider the creative contribution of
the programmer in determining whether to grant copyright protection, but
to allocate the right to the machine-authored work to the end-user once the
copyright is granted. While this would be desirable from a social policy
standpoint and still satisfy the legal requirements for copyrightability, such a
framework contravenes the language of the Copyright Act. Specifically, 17
U.S.C. § 106 states that the exclusive rights in copyrighted works are conferred
to the “owner,” referring to the “author” of the copyrightable work. To qualify
as an author, a party must have contributed to the copyrightable work.74 A
framework that assesses copyrightability based on the contribution of the
programmer but grants protection to the end-user would end up granting
protection to a non-author as defined by § 106. Absent the work-product
doctrine, it would be illogical and legally impermissible for a court to determine
that an individual’s original and creative contribution de facto gives rise to
copyright protection for another individual. This holds true despite the fact
that the programmer may have licensed his software to the end-user.75

72 See Samuelson, supra note 9, at 1203-04 (discussing the economic factors and technical
expertise that place the end-user of a generator program in a superior position to evaluate a machineauthored work).
73 Id. at 1201-02.
74 See, e.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951) (“All
that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is that the ‘author’ contributed
something more than a ‘merely trivial’ variation, something recognizably ‘his own.’”).
75 See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that because a
company was a licensee of the defendant’s software, it was not an owner, was not entitled to the
rights of an owner, and was not entitled to invoke copyright defenses such as the first sale doctrine).
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The contribution/rights paradox is succinctly illustrated in the table below:

Programmer
End-User

Copyrightability Contribution

Copyright Protection Allocation
Programmer
End-User
Pros
• Best balances creative
contribution and right to
authorship in a manner
consistent with the statute
Cons
• Over-rewards the
programmer by creating a
monopoly over
copyrightable works

Pros
• None
Cons
• Copyrightability evaluated
on the party that
contributed the least, rights
allocation leads to
monopoly. Grants copyright
protection to a non-author
in violation of § 106

Pros
• Best evaluation of
copyrightability contribution
• Assigned rights do not create
a monopoly
Cons
• Grants copyright protection
to a non-author in violation of
17 U.S.C. § 106. Person
evaluated as author for
copyrightability is not the one
who receives rights
Pros
• Assigned rights do not create
a monopoly
• Assignee has economic and
technical expertise to
determine value of
copyrightable work
Cons
• Difficult to make argument
that the contributions were
original and creative

C. Social Policy Arguments for Not Protecting Machine-Authored Works
The broader issue that remains unaddressed is whether machine-authored
works require copyright protection at all. Recall that creative works are
provided copyright protection for public benefit; the temporary grant of an
intellectual property monopoly serves as an economic incentive for producers
to create works for the public. I consider now whether copyright allocation for
the programmer or the end-user within the context of machine-authored works
would fulfill the Copyright Act’s intended purpose of benefitting the public.
Even at first cut, it is unclear how allowing the programmer to copyright
works produced by its software would further the purpose of copyright law.
In terms of economic incentives, the programmer is incentivized to produce
works through the copyright protection that is afforded to his code. It is
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difficult to construct a cogent argument for how granting additional protection
would further incentivize this creative behavior. Such additional protection
does not exist in other areas of intellectual property.76 One possible argument
concerns derivative works, but, as previously discussed, the machine-authored
work does not predicate on the coding in the same way that, for example, a
movie might be made using a copyrighted character (e.g., Mickey Mouse). A
better analogy might be to a person who buys a digital camera and then takes
some pictures. The software coding that enables the camera to function might
be copyrighted, but that does not entitle the copyright holder to stake a claim
on the pictures created by the photographer. At best, allocating the copyright
to the programmer would create few additional incentives for other programmers
to code programs that generate machine-authored works. At worst, such a
regime would enable widespread monopolization of all future works generated
by a single software program, skewing the law disproportionately in favor of
content producers to the detriment of the public.
A slightly more reasonable argument is that copyright protection may
incentivize the end-user to produce more creative works. But, in the economic
calculus, giving copyright protection to machine-authored works should, in
theory, neither add nor remove incentives for the end-user. The cost of
production for the end-user is, after all, zero. The end-user must license the
software from the programmer and would need to pay that cost, but it can
hardly be said that the cost is recouped through the copyright protection
granted to the articles generated. In fact, in the digital market, high demand
for immediately consumable media creates a powerful first-to-market
economic incentive that exists independently of any copyright protection.77
Because most websites generate revenue through advertisement, website
traffic—the total number of visitors to a website—becomes the primary
metric of economic success.78 In the area of online news, increasing traffic

76 For example, in patent law, an inventor is entitled to patent his own work but is not de facto
entitled to a patent on any work based on his patent. See Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1190 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (“To prove derivation in a[] [patent] interference proceeding, the person attacking the patent
must establish prior conception of the claimed subject matter and communication of the conception to
the adverse claimant.”). See generally 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS (2008).
77 See, e.g., Aydin Çelen, Tarkan Erdoğan & Erol Taymaz, Fast Moving Consumer Goods:
Competitive Conditions and Policies 32-33 (Econ. Research Ctr., Working Paper in Economics 05/13,
2005) (finding, through an empirical study on Turkey’s market, that fast-moving goods are
competitive and, therefore, that regulation may be unnecessary so its implementation should be
considered with care).
78 See Shaun Quarton, 7 Key Metrics to Track the Success of Your Website, TORQUE (Mar. 5, 2015),
http://torquemag.io/2015/03/7-key-website-metrics-track [https://perma.cc/58DV-N74D] (noting that
traffic volume is fundamentally important because it tracks growth and thus revenue).
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means getting new information to publication as quickly as possible.79 The
time it would take for the Copyright Office to grant copyright protection for
a given article would likely exceed the useful lifespan of the article many times
over.80 Thus, there is no real additional social benefit to granting the end-user
copyright protection.
The first-mover economic incentive in digital media exists regardless of
whether the work receives copyright protection. Since none of the traditional
benefits of copyright protection hold in the case of machine-authored works,
copyright makes an end-user no more or less likely to produce. Because the
copyright protection process for online media moves too slowly to meaningfully
provide a public economic benefit, it would not make sense from a social
policy standpoint to extend such protection.
IV. PROTECTION PROPOSALS DESIGNED FOR
MACHINE-AUTHORED WORKS
Given how machine-authored works fit in the existing jurisprudence, an
alternative protection scheme should be devised to support beneficial social
policy. This Part contemplates three potential schemes and examines their
respective shortcomings.
A. Immediate Entry into the Public Domain
One possible treatment would be for all machine-authored works to enter
into the public domain immediately. On its face, this proposition seems
extreme—it appears to deprive the theoretical legal author of rights that would
traditionally have been allocated to him. Upon scrutiny, however, this treatment
offers several practical benefits and has relatively few drawbacks.
Under this treatment, the true “author” of the machine-authored work is
in fact the software. Because the software is not a legal entity, this treatment
would not deprive it of any rights, as it has no legal rights to begin with.
Further, the programmer would receive adequate compensation and legal
protection through the copyrightability of her code. And the end-user, while
deprived of the opportunity to copyright the original machine-authored
work, could nevertheless copyright any derivative works that she creates using
the machine-authored work as a springboard. Indeed, in the case of the Los
79 See, e.g., MARK BRIGGS, JOURNALISM NEXT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO DIGITAL REPORTING
AND PUBLISHING 57 (3d ed. 2016) (discussing how Twitter’s reporting simplicity allowed it to

acquire a first-mover advantage).
80 See Carlos Castillo, Mohammad El-Haddad, Jürgen Pfeffer & Matt Stempeck,
Characterizing the Life Cycle of Online News Stories Using Social Media Reactions, PROC. 17TH ACM
CONF. ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK & SOC. COMPUTING 211, 214-15 (2014)
(finding a steep drop in the number of visitors six hours after an article has been published).
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Angeles Times and Quakebot, the revised and finalized article published on the
L.A. Times’s website would likely remain copyrightable under this framework.
Assuming that the work of the journalists and editors in fleshing out the
article was sufficient to satisfy the standards of originality and creativity, the
works of human creativity built on the foundation of machine authors would
retain their entitlement to copyright protection. In one sense, then, placing
all machine-authored works in the public domain would promote the public’s
interest in access to creative works without unduly stifling creative incentives
to the content producers.
The strongest criticism of this framework is the practical difficulty in
execution. Given how difficult it can be to distinguish human works and
machine-authored works, demonstrating to the Copyright Office that the work
is human-generated rather than machine-created will prove increasingly more
complex. Currently, machine authors produce only relatively simple articles
composed primarily of facts and statistics. However, it is plausible to imagine,
in the not-so-distant future, a much more sophisticated machine author that
can compose eloquent novels. A potential solution would be to direct
programmers to embed some kind of watermark in the machine-authored
output, but there would of course be practical workarounds.
Notably, however, this criticism neglects to recognize the dual nature of
copyright protection. A copyright must be enforced to have teeth: if such a
framework were adopted, alleged infringers would have to establish through
evidence that the work in question was machine-authored and that the
copyright protection is invalid. Thus, this public domain framework would
have the practical effect of increasing the difficulty of enforcing false
copyrights and deterring litigation.
B. End-User: The Quasi-Property Treatment
If copyright protection must be given to the end-user in some manner, one
possible allocation would be a quasi-property right that affords the end-user
full rights against direct competitors within the industry but not against
members of the general public. An excellent example of such a quasi-property
right can be found in International News Services v. Associated Press.81 In this
case, the two parties were competing news services that reported during

81 See 248 U.S. 215, 230 (1918) (“The right of the purchaser of a single newspaper to spread
knowledge of its contents gratuitously, for any legitimate purpose not unreasonably interfering with
complainant’s right to make merchandise of it, may be admitted; but to transmit that news for
commercial use, in competition with complainant—which is what defendant has done and seeks to
justify—is a very different matter.”).
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World War I.82 While the Associated Press (AP) reported directly from the
front, the Allied Powers had effectively banned International News Services
(INS) from reporting on the news.83 As a workaround, INS accessed AP news
through the AP news bulletin, rewrote the news, and published it as their own
hours later in the West.84 Consequently, AP filed a lawsuit against INS. INS
contended that the underlying facts in AP’s news articles were unprotected
and that their rewritings did not infringe on the particular expression of AP’s
copyrighted works.85 The Supreme Court held that a quasi-property right
could be created against INS because AP created the material as a result of the
expenditure of labor, skill, and money.86 In effect, INS’s actions constituted
misappropriation that deprived AP of the full benefits of its labor.87
The holding of INS v. AP has been weakened in many ways since 1918.
After Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, the case carries little authority because it
relies on federal common law.88 Further, later courts have held that “sweat of
brow” work is unprotected.89 Some courts have created narrow exceptions for
“hot news,” where the information is generated at a cost and is time sensitive.90

82 See id. at 230 (“The parties are in the keenest competition between themselves in the
distribution of news throughout the United States . . . .”).
83 News Pirating Case in Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1918, at 14.
84 See Associated Press v. Int’l News Servs., 240 F. 983, 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (discussing how
INS paid individuals with access to the AP bulletin to furnish news such as the German raid on the
east coast of England).
85 INS, 248 U.S. at 233.
86 See id. at 236 (“[A]lthough we may and do assume that neither party has any remaining
property interest as against the public in uncopyrighted news matter after the moment of its first
publication, it by no means follows that there is no remaining property interest in it as between
[INS and AP]. For . . . news matter . . . is stock in trade, to be gathered at the cost of enterprise,
organization, skill, labor, and money, and . . . we hardly can fail to recognize that for this purpose,
and as between [the parties], it must be regarded as quasi property, irrespective of the rights of either
as against the public.”).
87 See id. at 240 (“But in a court of equity, where the question is one of unfair competition, if
that which complainant has acquired fairly at substantial cost may be sold fairly at substantial profit,
a competitor who is misappropriating it for the purpose of disposing of it to his own profit and to
the disadvantage of complainant cannot be heard to say that it is too fugitive or evanescent to be
regarded as property.”).
88 See 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that there is no “federal general common law” and
mandating that federal courts apply substantive state law to resolving claims under state law); see
also Paul Goldstein, Federal System Ordering of the Copyright Interest, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 49, 49 (“It
has been suggested that the credence due the International News Service case today is minimal: that
subsequent decisions have restricted its doctrine to the news context and that, in any event, it is but
a derelict of the federal common law, untenable after Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.”).
89 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 353 (1991) (“Decisions of this Court
applying the 1909 Act make clear that the statute did not permit the ‘sweat of the brow’ approach.”).
90 See, e.g., NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 852-53 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that “hot news”
misappropriation claims were permitted on the grounds that, without protection of property rights
in this information, there would not be an incentive to collect and distribute time-sensitive news
and the public would suffer accordingly).
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Even then, the Copyright Act of 1976 may preempt the misappropriation
claim.91 Machine-authored works are an excellent fit for a “hot-news”
exception. The immediacy of the news being reported is the precise reason for
using a machine author, and, if it becomes necessary to allocate rights to the
end-user, limiting the scope of those rights to competition within the industry
strikes a better balance for advancing the public interest. An end-user would
be protected from potential competitors capitalizing on the timeliness of the
end-user’s information, which is the fundamental value proposition of the
machine-author software. At the same time, the public would not be
prevented from using the works. The end-user would have no rightful claim
against the public because allowing these claims would be detrimental to the
public interest.
Granted, applying a quasi-property framework within the context of
machine-authored works may require more nuance with machine-authored
works than was required with their predecessors. One might argue that the
quasi-property right effectively raises a first-to-market issue, allowing the
fastest party to secure the quasi-property right and rendering everyone else
an infringer. This would be problematic in the machine-author context, as the
same software could be licensed out to multiple parties to generate works
simultaneously, potentially rendering it impossible to determine who should
hold the right. Furthermore, machines will always operate faster than humans,
and a quasi-property treatment might render most journalism to be infringing.
Notably, in INS, the two parties did not independently generate works
based on the same set of underlying facts. Rather, one party clearly
misappropriated the efforts of the other. Thus, it could easily be the case that
quasi-property rights are assigned to anyone who has created a work through
her own efforts, with no liability in the absence of misappropriation. Such
treatment would protect a content producer by continuing to punish infringers
who obtain an unfair advantage through misappropriation while neatly
circumventing the potential technical issues that could arise.
C. Programmer Allocation: One-for-One Matching
If copyright protection is granted directly to the programmer, the scope
of protection should be very narrow in light of the potential for copyright
stockpiling. For instance, the right of the programmer could be reduced to
only protect against one-to-one copying of the underlying source, where
infringement occurs only if an ordinary person applying contemporaneous
91 See Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 2011)
(finding that the plaintiffs’ “hot news” misappropriation claim was preempted by federal copyright
law). But see NBA, 105 F.3d at 852 (concluding that “only a narrow ‘hot-news’ misappropriation claim
survives preemption for actions concerning material within the realm of copyright”).
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standards would find the work to be a direct copy. While this may raise some
concerns of judicial activism, a standard with room for judicial discretion is
not novel.92 Allowing courts to find infringement through a reasonable
person test would empower victims of bona fide infringement to bring cases
while deterring frivolous litigation.
Any stronger treatment, especially a broad general grant of copyright
protection such as that which has historically been found in other media,
would give the programmer far too much bargaining power, akin to a
monopoly. This is especially true because, in practice, the programmer is
likely to be a corporation.93 With far more resources than any one individual,
these entities are much more likely to protect their intellectual property
through litigation. The hazards of affording copyright protection to a single
programmer are thus greatly exacerbated by the for-profit nature of coders in
application, making it all the more important that the copyright—should it
be afforded to the programmer—be as thin as possible.
CONCLUSION
When the Crown of England first found it necessary to incentivize
creativity, it passed the Statute of Anne 1710.94 When Congress found a
similar need in the United States, it passed the Copyright Act of 1790.95 Since
then, every amendment96 and extension has been passed on the claim that it
would promote creativity and benefit the public good.97 Now, not for the first
92 For example, the Supreme Court had, in the context of obscenity, considered an “I know it
when I see it” rule. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I shall
not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that
shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it
when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.”); see also Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 30-34 (1973) (establishing a reasonable person test to determine obscenity).
93 For a list of natural language processing startups with an average valuation of $5.1 million a
piece, see Natural Language Processing Startups, ANGELLIST https://angel.co/natural-language-processing
[https://perma.cc/V3E2-4S98].
94 8 Anne c. 19 (Eng.).
95 Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124.
96 For example, the subject category was expanded in 1909 from maps, charts, and books to all
works of an author, and again in 1976 to an open list with eight major categories. See An Act to
Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909);
see also Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
97 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 3 (1996) (“[The Copyright Term Extension Act] will provide
significant trade benefits . . . while ensuring fair compensation for American creators who deserve
to benefit fully from the exploitation of their works. Moreover, by stimulating the creation of new
works and providing enhanced economic incentives to preserve existing works, such an extension
will enhance the long-term volume, vitality and accessibility of the public domain.”). Although this
is the underlying policy argument, often in practice the amendments or extensions have had the
opposite effect. See, e.g., Steve Schlackman, How Mickey Mouse Keeps Changing Copyright Law, ART
L.J. (Feb. 15, 2014), http://artlawjournal.com/mickey-mouse-keeps-changing-copyright-law [https://
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time, we face the question of whether extending copyright protection to a
new class of works—those created by machine authors—is to the benefit of
the general public.
Journalism is only one application of machine-authorship. Similar programs
are being created in fields as diverse as fractal analysis and music composition.
As these machine-made programs become a common form of creative
expression, the law must adapt to new technology if it is to fulfill its
commitment to advancing the public interest.
Given the technological nature of the products and the incentive structure
of the various parties, there are serious questions to consider before affording
copyright protection to machine-authored works. On the one hand, the
programmer can already copyright her software. It is not clear that allowing
her to copyright the output of these programs would further incentivize her
to write programs without severely handicapping public access. On the other
hand, the end-user has commercial interests, which, in the digital age,
incentivize using programs to publish news articles regardless of whether
these articles are copyrightable. In light of these incentive structures, a strong
argument can be made that, as a matter of public policy, machine-authored
works should not be afforded any copyright protection. While these works
would likely satisfy the established legal requirements of the Copyright Act
and subsequent interpretations, there remain fundamental questions of
authorship, allocation, and public benefit.
This generation of mechanical authors needs no legal motivation to
generate creative works. Financial motivations and legal reasoning do not
incentivize the machine author of the future. Although machine authorship
is protected by existing copyright law, it would occur with or without
additional legal protection. Regardless of whether or not the law grants
copyright protection, programs will continue to work away with each passing
moment, processing, computing, and creating. It would be meaningless and,
indeed, against public policy to try to fit machine-authored works into current
copyright law.

perma.cc/FJB3-EMRX] (discussing how Disney has lobbied to extend the copyright term every time
Mickey Mouse was on the verge of entering the public domain).

